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Working in a complete-markets setting, a property of asset demands is
identi…ed that is inconsistent with the investor’s preference being based on
probabilities. In this way, a market counterpart of the Ellsberg Paradox is
provided.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Ellsberg Paradox and related evidence (see [1] for a survey) shows that
decision-makersmay not use probabilities to represent likelihoods and guide choice
in settings where information is imprecise. In such environments, where ambiguity
prevails in addition to risk, nonindi¤erence (aversion, for example) to ambiguity is
inconsistent with the global reliance on probabilities. Though this evidence is con-
…ned to experimental settings, it is highly intuitive. For this reason and because it
is intuitive also that the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion may be important in
market settings, the Ellsberg Paradox has stimulated the development of models
of preference that are not based on probabilities as well as applications of these
models to asset market settings.
However, this literature has not addressed the following question that is the
focus here: Is there behavior in a market setting that is inconsistent with the
decision-maker’s preference being based on probabilities? The intention is to
provide a market counterpart of the Ellsberg Paradox.
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Dana.To be more precise, de…ne ‘based on probabilities’ in the sense of Machina and
Schmeidler [5], a property that they term probabilistic sophistication. Consider
an investor who chooses a preference maximizing portfolio given a complete set
of asset markets. I identify properties of her asset demand function that rule out
probabilistic sophistication of preference, just as the typical choices in the Ellsberg
experiment rule out probabilistic sophistication for that setting.
2. ASSET DEMANDS AND PROBABILITIES
Let S = f1;:::s;:::Sg denote a …nite state space. Securities have real-valued
payo¤s. Given a complete set of security markets (and the absence of arbitrage),
there is no loss of generality in supposing that trades are in elementary Arrow-
Debreu securities with corresponding prices ¼ = (¼s)s2S, a vector in RS
++. The
investor has unit wealth and preference order º on RS. Her problem is to …nd x
in RS such that ¼ ¢ x · 1 and, for all y 2 RS,
¼ ¢ y · 1 =) x º y. (2.1)
Denote by D(R1) the set of lotteries (probability distributions on R1) with
…nite support. Say that º is probabilistically sophisticated if there exist: (i) a
probability measure p on S and (ii) a real-valued functional W de…ned on D(R1)
and strictly monotone there in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, such
that
x º y i¤ W(ªx;p) ¸ W(ªy;p),
where ªx;p and ªy;p are the lotteries induced respectively by x and y. In other
words, the probability measure p is used to translate any prospect x into a lottery.
The latter purely risky prospect is then evaluated via the functional W, which is
unrestricted (except for monotonicity).
An implication of probabilistic sophistication for the asset demands can now
be described. Suppose that for some speci…c pair of states s and t, that1
¼s ¸ ¼t and xs > xt. (2.2)
Thus the demand for the state s security is larger even though it has the higher
price. Presumably, this is because state s is viewed as more likely than state t.
1Below, x and x0 denote demands at prices ¼ and ¼0 respectively. For any two states s and
t, x¡s¡t is the vector in RS¡2 obtained from x by deleting the s and t components.
2Accordingly, if state prices change to ¼0 with ¼0
s · ¼0
t, then the demand for the
state s security should again be larger.
A more precise statement and proof follow.
Theorem 2.1. Let ¼ and ¼0 be in RS
++ and let x and x0 be correspondingsolutions
in (2.1) for the preference º. Suppose that there exist states s and t such that
both
(a) ¼s ¸ ¼t and ¼0
s · ¼0
t, with at least one inequality strict, and
(b) xs > xt and x0
s < x0
t.
Then º is not probabilistically sophisticated.
Proof. Given prices ¼, it is feasible to reverse the demands for states s and t and
to choose (x¡s¡t;xt;xs), (demanding xt is state s), rather than x = (x¡s¡t;xs;xt)
(demanding xs is state s). That is because
¼sxt + ¼txs · ¼sxs + ¼txt. (2.3)
Therefore,
x = (x¡s¡t;xs;xt) º (x¡s¡t;xt;xs). (2.4)
In other words, it is preferable to have the larger outcome in state s rather than
state t. If probabilistic sophistication prevails (relative to p and W), then the
latter preference is invariant to the speci…c outcomes in states s and t and to
changes in the common component x¡s¡t. This is axiom P4¤ in Machina and
Schmeidler’s axiomatization of probabilistic sophistication; alternatively, it follows






















If ¼s > ¼t, then the inequality in (2.3) is strict. Therefore the same is true for
the rankings in (2.4) and (2.5) and the latter case contradicts the optimality of
x0. Similarly if ¼0
s > ¼0
t.
Remark 1. The proof does not use the full force of the existence of a single
budget constraint as delivered by complete markets. The critical requirement is
that ¼, s and t satisfy: If x is feasible given ¼ and if x¡s¡t = y¡s¡t, ¼sys + ¼tyt ·
¼sxs + ¼txt, then also y is feasible given ¼.
3The prices ¼0 and ¼ can di¤er arbitrarily in states other than s and t. This
broadens the scope of the Theorem and also permits intuition for the behavior
described there violating probabilistic sophistication. The intuition is as follows:
In a thinly disguised translation of the setting in the 3-color Ellsberg Paradox,
suppose that S = fs1;s2;s3g, that the investor is con…dent that the probability of
the …rst state is 1=3, but that she has only a vague idea of the relative likelihoods
of states 2 and 3, that is, these states are ambiguous. Aversion to this ambiguity
is expressed in a complementarity between the contingent wealths for states 2 and
3; for example, in the typical Ellsberg choices,
(100; 0; 0) Â (0; 100; 0) but
(100; 0;100) Á (0; 100;100).
To relate to the Theorem, take s = 1 and t = 2. If ¼3 is large, then it would be
too costly to purchase very much of the state 3 security. Because of the ambiguity
of state 2, this leaves the state 1 security attractive relative to that for state 2.
Accordingly, it is plausible that x1 > x2 even if ¼1 ¸ ¼2. However, under ¼0, if
¼0
3 is small, the investor can a¤ord to buy more of the state 3 security and the
complementarity between states 2 and 3 acts to increase the appeal of state 2
relative to the situation under ¼. Therefore, x0
1 < x0
2 is plausible even if ¼0
1 · ¼0
2.
The refutation of probabilistic sophistication requires that one observe de-
mands at two distinct price vectors where the investor has the same beliefs. In
other words, the observations described in the Theorem rule out the conjunction
of probabilistic sophistication and constant beliefs. The reliance on two price
situations is not surprising; for example, the Ellsberg Paradox also involves two
choices. In addition, Lo [4] has shown recently that when the choice from only
one feasible set is observable, then one cannot distinguish between subjective
expected utility (a fortiori, probabilistic sophistication) and any preference sat-
isfying a form of monotonicity (Savage’s P3). Nevertheless, the applicability of
the Theorem is limited by the assumption that the same beliefs prevail at the two
price situations.
It is natural to wonder about the converse of the Theorem, or alternatively,
about the power of the implied test of probabilistic sophistication. Is the behavior
described in the Theorem so restrictive that it would contradict also many models
of nonprobabilistically sophisticated preferences? In this connection, it is readily
seen that the noted behavior does not contradict state-dependent expected utility
theory, Choquet-expected utility theory [7] or the multiple-priors model [3]. Thus
the implied test is powerful against these alternatives.
4Conclude with an extension to aggregate data that also involves a joint hy-
pothesis. If one observes only the aggregate demand for securities of a group of
agents, then one can refute the joint hypothesis of probabilistic sophistication and
common (across agents) beliefs. For each investor i = 1;:::;I, denote preference
by ºi and wealth by Mi. Let xi = (xs;i)s2S be the optimal portfolio for i given
Mi and prices ¼, that is, ¼ ¢ xi · Mi and, for all y 2 RS,
¼ ¢ y · Mi =) x ºi y. (2.6)
Similarly for demands x0
i given ¼0 and wealth M0
i.
Theorem 2.2. Let (¼; (Mi)i2I) and (¼0; (M0
i)i2I) be two price-wealth situations
and let xi and x0
i be corresponding solutions as in (2.6) for the preference ºi,
i = 1;:::;I. Suppose that there exist states s and t such that both
(a) ¼s ¸ ¼t and ¼0
s · ¼0
t, with at least one inequality strict, and
(b) §ixs;i > §i xt;i and §ix0
s < §i x0
t.
Then it is impossible that every ºi be probabilistically sophisticated with a com-
mon probability measure.
Proof. Roughly, §ixs;i > §i xt;i =) xs;i > xt;i for some i =) p(s) > p(t) for
the common probability measure p =)everyone prefers the higher outcome in
state s rather than in state t. This is feasible given ¼0. Thus x0
s;i ¸ x0
t;i for every
i. (Details are as in the proof of the previous theorem.)
Finally, one could view prices as endogenous and take endowments !i 2 RS as
exogenous, with Mi = ¼¢!i. In this way, the Theorem delivers restrictions across
equilibria of two exchange economies (ºi; !i)i2I and (ºi; !0
i)i2I that contradict
probabilistic sophistication of all agents relative to a probability measure that is
common to all agents and both economies. (Simply replace aggregate demands
in (b) by aggregate endowments.)
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